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ABSTRACT
The life of a company depends upon the fine balance between its
management, led by its Board of Directors and shareholders, and
non-shareholder constituencies acting as the risk bearers. The Board
of Directors therefore is subject to fiduciary duties towards both
these constituencies at all financial phases of the company—
solvency, insolvency and borderline insolvency. The director
liability framework in India is currently split with obligations
enshrined under the Companies Act, of 2013 during solvency and
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016 during insolvency and
borderline stage. The lack of judicial interpretation and scholarly
discourse on the insolvent and borderline insolvent director liability
framework has resulted in several practical challenges. To
understand parallels, this paper comparatively analyzes the liability
framework as existing under the corporate and insolvency laws of
the United States and the United Kingdom with the Indian
insolvency law. This paper suggests that there is a need to align the
Indian corporate and insolvency law through statutory measures to
increase the remedial protections available to creditors during
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borderline insolvency. This paper also highlights mitigation
measures which can be undertaken by management to reduce the
scope of director liability until legislative or judicial clarity is
provided on the framework.
Keywords: Director liability framework; borderline insolvency;
wrongful trading liability; derivative actions; out-of-court
restructuring; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
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1. INTRODUCTION: DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITY DURING CORPORATE
FAILURE
A company’s status as an artificial legal entity relies upon the
wisdom and actions undertaken by its board of directors.
Accordingly, to protect the interests of the company, corporate law
envisages a certain set of affirmative and negative duties upon the
board of directors. The nature of these duties varies, but they
generally include the duty of care, loyalty, the avoidance of any
conflicts of interest, acting in good faith, promoting the objectives
of the company, and initiating insolvency/liquidation proceedings.1
Further, since the company does not operate in isolation but works
within the business environment, these duties must be exercised
towards the company and with respect to various stakeholders,
including shareholders, workers, creditors, communities,
governments, and regulators.2
Throughout a corporation’s lifecycle, it might go through the
following stages, in the context of insolvency: solvency, borderline
insolvency (“borderline” and “twilight zone” are used
synonymously), and insolvency. The nature of directors’ duties
varies during these stages. It is undisputed that the primary set of
duties in the solvency stage lies towards the shareholders, unless
non-shareholders have contracted for managerial protection.3 The
1
See SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. Thought Works, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 987 (Del. Ch.
2010) (stating certain circumstances in which a corporation cannot diminish its
ability to pay debt); In re Abbott Lab’ys. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795,
808 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that Delaware law requires directors to act according to
their duties of care, loyalty, and good faith); In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc.,
474 F.3d 421, 428 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that a director’s fiduciary duty extends
towards creditors in the event of insolvency); N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) (finding that directors have
a fiduciary duty to manage a corporation for the benefit of its shareholders).
2
See Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 582–84 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (finding the
degree of a director’s fiduciary duty to creditors dependent on vicinity to
insolvency and that gross negligence constitutes breach of the duty of care);
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003) (holding that
a board cannot enter into contracts that void its fiduciary duties to shareholders);
Lenahan L. O’Connell et al., An Organizational Field Approach to Corporate Rationality:
The Role of Stakeholder Activism, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 93, 93–94 (2005) (describing
corporations as organizations “nested in environments,” whose actions impact
those occupying corporate environments, including workers and government
officials).
3
The private contract between debtors and creditors may provide for a
contractual clause to afford duty of primacy over unsecured creditors during the
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decisions made by directors during the solvency stage are generally
in respect to the expansion of business, the purchase of additional
assets, and the increase and diversification of business capital. Since
shareholders are the primary risk bearers during solvency, directors’
actions most directly affect shareholders. 4 Thus, in solvencynonshareholders, including creditors, do not have a direct remedy
against directors.5 The policy rationale behind this protection lies in
the genesis of company ownership being vested in shareholders and
the opportunity for creditors to negotiate special protections
through their debt obligation contracts. 6 Creditor bargaining
repayment of interest. The contract may provide for special circumstances for
affording such primacy, which includes fraud, insolvency, or violation of any
express law in this regard. See Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. 610, 623 (1873) (noting that
corporations “exist mainly for [the shareholders’] benefit.”); Geyer v. Ingersoll
Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (agreeing with defendant that, in
general, “directors do not owe creditors duties beyond the relevant contractual
terms absent ‘special circumstances . . . e.g., fraud, insolvency, or a violation of
statute’”) (quoting Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974) rev’d in part
on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975)); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Rank
Org. Ltd. [1985] BCLC 11, 20 (Eng.) (listing the primary duties of directors: acting
in good faith in accordance with the company’s interests and treating each
shareholder fairly); Re Pantone 485 Ltd. [2002] 1 BCLC 266, 285 (Eng.) (highlighting
the “firmly established” principle that when a company is insolvent, directors’
fiduciary duties shift towards creditors).
4
See Brown v. Vencap Inv. Corp., 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3424, 1, 28–32
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1984) (holding that shareholders, but not creditors, have
rights of action against directors for mismanagement, in part because shareholders
are liable for the losses); Radhabari Tea Co. v. Bhattacharjee, 2010 SCC Online
Gauhati HC 231, 300, 322 (holding that unless minority shareholders can show
fraud or other bad-faith acting, they cannot sue directors for offering shares at a
board-approved price during an insolvency proceeding) (India).
5
See Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (finding that
courts can provide protection against risks to bondholders by upholding concrete
indenture provisions negotiated between creditors and corporations); Metropo.
Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting
that courts have used the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to ensure
that bondholders received fair bargains through contract); Uppal Housing Pvt. Ltd.,
2019 SCC Online New Delhi HC 10604, paras. 40–42 (holding that shareholders are
not inherently parties to creditor-corporation contracts, which are supreme in the
insolvency context absent a showing of misrepresentation or mismanagement).
6
The proposition is long-recognized but expressly explained in N. Am.
Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101–02 (Del. 2007)
(holding that creditors cannot assert claims of a breach of fiduciary duty against
directors prior to insolvency, but once a corporation is insolvent, creditors have
standing to maintain such claims) and Berg & Berg Enters. v. Boyle, 178 Cal. App.
4th 1020, 1039 (2009) (reviewing the economic justification behind the general rule
of “no duty owned to creditors” prior to insolvency, finding that when a
corporation is solvent, the shareholders are the ‘residual claimants of the
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capacity is protected by a lack of privity between non-shareholder
groups (such as creditors) and the company and the presence of
remedial measures for creditors, such as the clawback of fraudulent
conveyance and the implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing.7
Similarly, during the insolvency stage, there is a shift in
directors’ duties towards the creditors, who become residual riskbearers. The best interests during this stage lies in the conservation
of the company’s remaining assets for revival or repayment of the
obligated debt. 8 While courts are divided over the complete
termination of the duties of directors towards shareholders during
the insolvency stage, there is some consensus that duties are
primarily owed towards creditors, and, if afforded by statutory law,
towards shareholders.9 Thus, absent relevant statutory protections,
shareholders are not afforded standing against directors during
insolvency. The policy rationale behind this approach is to provide
protection to creditors as they lend debt with an expectation of
earning interest, which can only be secured if corporate assets are

corporation’s assets’ who bear primary risk and whose income is most directed
impacted by director action but ‘when insolvency arises, the value of creditors’
contract claims may be affected by management’s business decisions in a way it
was not before insolvency’”).
7
See Rutheford B. Campbell & Christopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary
Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J.
CORP. L. 491, 493, 516–17 (2007) (arguing that creditors are not without protection,
but can rely on fraudulent conveyance statutes and ex ante contract provisions to
offset risk).
8
See Wood v. Drummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436, 439-40 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No.
17,944) (holding that creditors have a primary claim to a corporation’s capital in the
event of insolvency, while stockholders have a residual claim after all debt is
repaid).
9
See Arnold v. Knapp, 75 W. Va. 804, 811 (1915) (reviewing “settled [law]
that when a corporation becomes insolvent, or in a failing condition, the officers
and directors no longer represent the stockholders, but by the fact of insolvency,
become trustees for the creditors”); Bank Leumi-Le-Israel v. Sunbelt Indus., 485 F.
Supp. 556, 559 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (stating that when a corporation is insolvent, director
duties are primarily towards creditors and secondarily towards stockholders); see
also Fredrick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 607, 622,
631 (2007) (arguing against applying director fiduciary duties towards creditors
when a firm is at or near insolvency because the creditors are often sufficiently
sophisticated to offset risk via contract negotiations and that states already provide
other causes of action for creditors, such as fraudulent transfer or veil piercing).
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conserved, 10 resulting in a deepening of the insolvency. 11 The
shifting of duties during insolvency is fruitful only when there is
clarity over the legislative determination of insolvency. The
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016 (India) (hereinafter
“IBC”), 12 by envisaging a default-based cash flow test, provides
sufficient grounds for understanding the ramifications of certain
determinations of insolvency.13 The remedies available to creditors
during the insolvency stage include injuncting the directors from
transferring, encumbering, or liquidating corporate assets, or from
engaging in transactions which result in preferential treatment
towards different categories of creditors.14

10
See Elina Chechelnitsky, D&O Insurance in Bankruptcy: Just Another
Business Contract, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 825, 833 (2009) (highlighting that
creditors lend to firms with sole purpose of “recover[ing] their money with
interest”).
11
See Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 204–05
(Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting a cause of action for deepening insolvency, finding that
Delaware law does not require an insolvent company to cease operations, liquidate,
or abstain from incurring additional debt). The phrase “deepening insolvency”
refers to instances where the insolvent corporation or its creditors are harmed when
a director fraudulently disposes of corporate property. See Stephen M. Packman,
Directors and Officers in the Zone of Insolvency; Take Action with Caution to Avoid
Personal Exposure, 193 N.J. L. J., Aug. 18, 2008, at 3 (providing that the concept of
“deepening insolvency” is premised on a director’s obligation to avoid the
accordance of additional debt to negligently or fraudulently extend the life of the
firm).
12
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (India).
13
See generally Robert J. Stearn & Cory D. Kandestin, Delaware’s Solvency Test:
What is it and Does it Make Sense? A Comparison of Solvency Tests under the Bankruptcy
Code and Delaware Law, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 165, 165-87 (2011) (providing the two tests
recognized under Delaware law: the “balance sheet” test and the “cash flow test”;
the former established by the Bankruptcy Code and the latter brought forth by
courts to better aid the valuation of insolvent debtors); Andrew Keay, Challenging
Payments Made by Insolvent or Near Insolvent Companies, 3 NOTTINGHAM INSOLVENCY
& BUS. L. J. 215, 215-17, 227 (2015) (detailing U.K. law, which incorporates both tests
(not named as such) into a single analysis through which creditor claims will be
viewed in light of contextual circumstances); Stephen R. McDonnell, Geyer v.
Ingersoll Publ’ns Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors’ Burden from Shareholders to
Creditors, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177, 196 (1994) (arguing that jurisdictional variance in
the definition and tests for insolvency makes predicting whether a director may be
liable towards creditors “very difficult, if not impossible”).
14
See Joseph J. Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors upon
Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the “Trust Fund” Doctrine of Corporate Assets,
30 BUS. LAW. 1061, 1069, 1072 (1975) (noting that while courts will not force a firm
to void a sale or transfer of an asset on behalf of a creditor, they will enforce the
creditor’s equity in the proceeds from such an action).
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During the borderline or twilight stage, wherein a company
faces economic and financial crisis, there is a shift in director
duties. 15 The shifting of directors’ duties during borderline
insolvency remains a dilemma for courts, practitioners, and
academics due to the absence of legislative codification. 16 One
school of thought perceives that during the borderline stage,
directors owe duties towards the shareholders since this does not
necessarily lead to insolvency.17 Another school of thought suggests
that directors’ duties must be exercised towards creditors, as the
stage amounts to impeding circumstances which may result in
insolvency of the company. 18 Accordingly, the legal remedies
15
See generally Ryan Purslowe, Decisions in the Twilight Zone of Insolvency—
Should Directors Be Afforded a New Safe Harbour?, 13 U.. NOTRE DAME AUSTL. L. REV.
113, 113–14 (2011) (detailing that Australian corporate directors have a duty
towards creditors to prevent their company from trading while insolvent, which
raises difficulties in the twilight period where the future of the company’s finances
is uncertain).
16
See, e.g., Gaurav Joshi, Position of Directors in Twilight Zone, IBC LS. (May
14, 2020), https://ibclaw.in/paper-on-position-of-directors-in-twilight-zone-bygaurav-joshi/ [https://perma.cc/2W4F-AK9Z]) (detailing the IBC’s improvements
upon previous legislation that “demystify” corporate duties during the twilight
zone); see also Stephen Bainbridge, Much Ado about Little - Directors’ Fiduciary Duties
in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335, 335–37 (2007) (arguing that the
business judgment rule is poorly understood due to a lack of a coherent and
delineated theory); Marshall Huebner & Hugh McCullough, The Fiduciary Duties of
Directors: Emerging Clarity, ICLG (May 1, 2008), https://www.dwt.com//media/files/publications/2008/01/the-fiduciary-duties-of-directors-oftroubled-us-c/files/the-fiduciary-duties-of-directors-of-troubled-us/fileattachment/the-fiduciary-duties-of-directors-of-troubled-u-s.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DA8-P7DE] (praising the Delaware Supreme Court for a series
of decisions that “wiped away a fair amount of confusion” and established more
precise, coherent doctrine governing director duties in the near-insolvency stage).
17
See generally Hallinan v. Republic Bank & Tr. Co., 519 F. Supp. 2d 340, 349
n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that creditors can bring claims when debtors enter the
zone of insolvency); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 323 B.R. 345, 386 n.140 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005) (restating the common rule that “when a corporation becomes
insolvent or enters into the zone of insolvency, the fiduciary duties of a corporation
expand from its stockholders to its creditors”); Nancy A. Peterman & Sherri
Morissette, Directors Duties in the Zone of Insolvency: The Quandry of the Nonprofit
Corp., 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2004 (writing that the shift of director fiduciary
duties during the borderline stage also applies in the non-profit context).
18
See, e.g., Carrieri v. Jobs.com, Inc., 393 F.3d 508, 534 n.24 (5th Cir. 2004)
(noting that once directors are aware of the firms insolvency or proximity to
insolvency, they have expanded fiduciary duties to all of the corporation’s
creditors); Roselink Investors, L.L.C. v. Shenkman, 386 F. Supp. 2d 209, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that a subsidiary owes fiduciary duties to its parent
corporation and its creditors when it enters the zone of insolvency).

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2023

2022

Director Liability Framework

39

available to shareholders and non-shareholders also vary during the
borderline stage, ranging from direct action to derivative action
claims.19 The stark distinction between these schools of thought will
be discussed in the succeeding sections.
A literature review of the shifting of duties suggests that the law
on subject has undergone excessive scrutiny, which has, in fact,
resulted in expansive application of the duties beyond known
ventures, 20 which is further discussed in the succeeding sections.
The theoretical background to this shifting of duties lies in the
application of the “business judgment rule” 21 and “trust fund
doctrine”22Although corollaries of each other, both of these principles
impose an obligation upon the directors to act in the best interests of
the company. 23 The variance towards different stakeholders
depends upon the interpretation accorded over the years by judicial
and legislative lawmaking.24
This paper is organized as follows: Part Two covers the doctrine
of the Business Judgment Rule and the Trust Fund Doctrine, as well
as the legal framework of director responsibility as applicable in the
U.S. and U.K. Part Three seeks to understand the Indian director
responsibility framework as provided during solvency, insolvency,
19
See Terrence Arnold, Directors’ Duties in an Insolvency or Near Insolvency
Situation and Remedies Available to Creditors, JUD. COLLOQUIUM H.K., Sept. 2015, para.
46 (comparing remedies available to creditors in New Zealand and Canada, with
derivative actions and oppression claims being available in the former, but not the
latter).
20
See David Thomson, Directors, Creditors and Insolvency: A Fiduciary Duty or
a Duty Not to Oppress?, 58 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 31, 32-33 (2000); Jon Dwain
McLaughlin, The Uncertain Timing of Directors’ Shifting Fiduciary Duties in the Zone
of Insolvency: Using Altman’s Z-Score to Synchronize the Watches of Courts, Directors,
Creditors, and Shareholders, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 147, 160 (2008) (discussing the
evolution of director duties).
21
See Michele Ubelaker, Director Liability under the Business Judgment Rule:
Fact or Fiction?, 35 SW. L.J. 775, 775–76 (1981); Gerald Spindler, Trading in the Vicinity
of Insolvency, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 339, 349–50 (2006) (discussing the business
judgement rule and its application).
22
See Gregory Varallo & Jesse Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of
the Financially Troubled Company, 48 BUS. LAW. 239, 244 (1992); James Gadsen,
Enforcement of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 24 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 16, 56 (2005) (defining the trust fund doctrine).
23
See Philip Gavin, A Rejection of Absolutist Duties as a Barrier to Creditor
Protection: Facilitating Directorial Decisiveness Surrounding Insolvency through the
Business Judgment Rule, 15 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 313, 323–25 (2021)
(discussing the change in financial obligations between solvency and insolvency).
24
See generally Id. (discussing the changes in jurisprudence and statutes
affecting fiduciary responsibilities).
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and borderline insolvency. Part Four analyzes the challenges
associated with the existing Indian framework on director
responsibility and discusses possible solutions. Section Five
concludes with the liability mitigation measures which can be
undertaken by the directors until the challenges associated with the
existing framework are resolved.
2.

IMPUTATION OF RESPONSIBILITY: EVOLUTION OF THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE AND THE TRUST FUND DOCTRINE

The foundational basis for director duties towards various
stakeholders of a company is built on the Business Judgment Rule
and the Trust Fund Doctrine. The business judgment rule is a
presumptive and affirmative duty cast upon the board of directors
which assumes that all the actions and decisions they undertake,
based upon their commercial wisdom, are necessarily in the best
interest of the company. 25 The legal effect of this rule is that it
absolves the directors from corporate and personal liability for good
faith and honest errors in making business judgments.26 It is not a
substantive rule of protection but rather a set of evidentiary
premises rebuttable in nature.27 The rule was essentially developed
as a judicial creation by U.S. courts to protect company directors
from imposition of civil liability for the decisions they make on
behalf of a company28 and was gradually adopted across the world
to make debtor-friendly legislation.29
25
See INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY BOARD OF INDIA, NOTE ON DIRECTOR’S
LIABILITIES IN RESPECT OF AVOIDANCE TRANSACTIONS § 27.1 (2021) (defining the
business judgment rule).
26
See Michele Ubelaker, Director Liability under the Business Judgment Rule:
Fact or Fiction?, 35 SW. L.J. 775, 775–76 (1981) (defining the business judgment rule’s
application).
27
See Andrew Keay et. al., Business Judgment and Director Accountability: A
Study of Case-Law Over Time, 20 J. CORP. L. STUD. 359, 359–61 (2020) (confirming that
the business judgement rule is not a substantive rule).
28
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 90–93 (2004) (detailing the creation of the business
judgment rule).
29
See Friedrich Hamadziripi & Patrick Osode, The Nature and Evolution of the
Business Judgment Rule and Its Transplantation to South Africa Under the Companies Act
of 2008, 33 U. FORT HARE REV. 26, 27 (2019) (S. Afr.) (describing the adoption of the
business judgment rule).
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Under this rule, the plaintiff can present evidence to contradict
the actions of the board of directors as not being in the best interests
of a company. In a negative sense, the rule of jurisdiction of the
courts to test the validity of director conduct while serving in the
capacity of the officer of the company. 30 The policy rationale
outlining the rule is that in its absence, directors would often remain
under the threat of legal action brought by an aggrieved
stakeholder. 31 However, there are certain circumstances under
which safe harbor cannot be granted to directors under the rule such
as fraud, undervaluation of corporate property, conflict of interest,
non-arm’s length related transactions, unfair contracts, etc. 32
Similarly, when directors engage in inter-corporate transactions or
self-dealing not for the benefit of the company, then the protection
of the rule is not accorded.33
The trust fund doctrine, on the other hand, presupposes
negative liability upon the directors to not utilize corporate assets in
a manner prejudicial to the company’s interest or to the detriment of
stakeholders.34 The trust fund is not a “trust” in a legalistic sense,
however, as corporate assets have to be held in “quasi-trust” for
preservation during the liquidation of a company.35 The essence of
30
See generally Kelli Alces et al., Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary
Duty and Creditors of Troubled Companies—Theory and Policy, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 291
(2007) (outlining the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and the role of creditors
in a troubled company).
31
See Andrew Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule:
Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 444–46
(2007) (discussing the policy rationale of the business judgment rule).
32
See Jean Du Plessis & Jim Mathiopoulos, Defences and Relief from Liability
for Company Directors: Widening Protection to Stimulate Innovation, 31 AUSTL. J. CORP.
L. 17 (2017); Andrew Lumsden, The Business Judgement Defence – Insights from ASIC
v. Rich, 28 COS. & SEC. L.J. 1, 18 (2010) (listing the requirements of the safe harbor
usage of the business judgment rule).
33
See generally FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976–77 (4th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the acts of the defendant were unjust and fundamentally unfair).
34
See generally J. W. Callison, Why a Fiduciary Duty Shift to Creditors of
Insolvent Business Entities Is Incorrect as a Matter of Theory and Practice, 1 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 431 (2007) (discussing the legislative landscape behind the trust fund
doctrine).
35
The doctrine was applied initially by courts during the stage of
liquidation. However, with its extension in Wood v. Drummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436
(C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944) and Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). It was
made applicable in stages of borderline insolvency as well. See Ann E. Conaway
Stilson, Re-examining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution:
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the doctrine is that the company assets are held in a trust for
distribution amongst creditors, imposing a fiduciary duty upon the
directors to not dispose of those assets in contravention of the rights
of creditors.36 Thus, a legal duty is cast upon the directors to act for
the benefit of creditors and not necessarily for shareholders. The
doctrine, a judicial creation,37 was incorporated for certain directors’
obligations during insolvency; however, it has been expanded to
cover instances of solvency and borderline insolvency, 38 as
highlighted in the succeeding paragraphs. Similarly, the remedies
also depend upon their application in the respective life cycle of the
company and the existing protections available to shareholder and
non-shareholder constituencies.39
Historically, the director responsibility framework evolved quite
differently in the U.S. compared to the U.K. In the U.S., they
developed primarily through judicial interpretation of general
statutory laws, whereas in the U.K., specific protections were
provided within the statute itself.40 While Sundaresh has provided
a succinct account of the development of the legal position of the
shifting of duties in the context of U.S. and U.K. laws41, it is essential

Defining Director’s Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 76–78 (1995) (stating the
application of the business judgment rule).
36
See Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 354–55 (N.D. Tex. 1996)
(holding that Jewel Recovery did not meet the standard for relief under Delaware’s
trust fund doctrine).
37
See Wood v. Drummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944);
James Ellis & Charles Sayre, Trust-Fund Doctrine Revisited, 24 WASH. L. REV. & STATE
BAR J. 134, 134 (1949) (stating that the trust fund doctrine’s foundation as judge
made law).
38
See generally Neil Ruben, Duty to Creditors in Insolvency and the Zone of the
Insolvency: Delaware and the Alternatives, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 333 (2010) (discussing
Delaware’s usage of trust fund doctrine).
39
See generally James Rosenthal, The Corporate “Trust Fund” Doctrine is Alive
and Well in Ohio, OHIO LAW., July/Aug. 2012, at 24 (contrasting Ohio’s trust fund
doctrine and associated protections with Delaware’s doctrine).
40
See Richard M. Cieri & Michael J. Riela, Protecting Directors and Officers of
Corporations That Are Insolvent or in the Zone or Vicinity of Insolvency: Important
Considerations, Practical Solutions, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 295, 296, 300–01 (2004)
(stating the U.S.’s framework for director responsibility); see also Gautam
Sundaresh, In Whose Interests Should a Company Be Run? Fiduciary Duties of Directors
During Corporate Failure in India: Looking to the West for Answers, 8 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 291, 297–98 (2019).
41
See Sundaresh, supra note 40, at 297–98 (analysing the development of
corporate fiduciary duties in the U.S. and U.K.).
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to understand its impact on development of the nascent Indian
insolvency laws vis-à-vis corporate laws.
2.1. Director Liability Framework in the U.S.:
The Model Business Corporation Act of 2002, which provides for
minimum corporate governance norms for U.S. companies, states
that a director has a duty of good faith, care, and loyalty. 42 The
extent of recognition of these duties was left upon the state
legislations, with § 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law of
1899 providing that directors and officers of all corporations shall
have duties as defined by the bylaws.43 Further, § 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law of 1899 states that the bylaws
must not restrict the personal liability of directors in any manner in
regard to their fiduciary duties.44 The term ‘fiduciary duties’ was
not defined by the General Corporation Law of 1899, and the
Delaware Courts interpreted it to cover both the Business
Judgement Rule and the Trust Fund Doctrine. 45 The U.S. courts
have often held that the directors are vested with the duty of care
and are liable towards shareholders 46 , though not ordinarily
towards bondholders or creditors. 47 Similarly, § 548 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code provides for avoidance of fraudulent transfers
made within the period of two years which involve intentionally
fraudulent transfer or undervalued consideration outside the

42
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1969) (Am. Bar Ass’n, amended 2002);
Michael P. Dooley, Rules, Standards, and the Model Business Corporation Act, 74 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 50–51 (2011).
43
The reference to Delaware state law is made as a majority of U.S.
corporations are incorporated in this jurisdiction, making the state law applicable
to them. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 121 (2004) (discussing the close scrutiny of Delaware
chancery court cases).
44
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1899).
45
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Delaware Corporate Fiduciary
Law: Searching for the Optimal Balance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 1, 34 (2017).
46
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005).
47
Metro.Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524–25
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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ordinary course of business.48 The creditors at this stage are entitled
to very limited protection under the “implied covenant of good
faith” found in commercial contracts,49 and directors are constantly
under the threat of legal action by the shareholders for granting
contractual protection not specified under the law.50 The judicial
interpretation in the U.S. on creditor rights during insolvency and
borderline insolvency underwent a significant change due to a
multiplicity of lawsuits filed by creditors against directors over the
disposal of corporate assets.51 Gradually, the U.S. courts accorded
that during insolvency, primacy must be given to creditors’
expectations for the preservation of value of the company.52 This
resulted in creditors being allowed to pursue direct action claims
against the board of directors for the breach of fiduciary duties.53
The shifting of duties during borderline insolvency remained a
legal and policy challenge. This resulted in several divergent court
decisions due to a lack of clarity until the Delaware Chancery
Court’s decision in Credit Lyonnais Bank v. Pathe Communications.54
The court in this case was faced with a judicial determination of the
board of directors of the debtor company due to a challenge by the
creditor bank on account of repetitive defaults and based upon
conditions under the agreement to the leveraged buyout financing
of the debtor company.55 The court held that “where a corporation
is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, the board of directors is not
merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the
48
Amir Licht, My Creditor’s Keeper: Escalation of Commitment and Custodial
Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1732, 1736 (2021);
David Carlson, Fraudulent Transfers: Void and Voidable, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
1, 21–22 (2021).
49
Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986).
50
Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 958 (5th Cir. 1981); Andrew
Keay, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and
Over-Protection of Creditors, 66 MOD. L. REV. 665, 670 (2003).
51
Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary
Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23
SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1485–97 (1993).
52
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Comp., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligation to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 647, 666 (1995).
53
Prod. Resources Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp. Inc. 863 A.2d 772, 798 (Del. Ch.
2004).
54
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commun. Corp., Civ. A.
No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
55
Id. at *1–*3.
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corporate enterprise,” and, accordingly, companies during
borderline insolvency need to take into consideration the interests
of all categories of stakeholders, including shareholders, creditors,
suppliers, customers, etc.56
The Credit Lyonnaies judgment provided groundbreaking
guidance to the board of directors, as their fiduciary duties were
extended to cover creditors even prior to the initiation of formal
insolvency proceedings. 57 Different bankruptcy courts made
varying interpretations of the judgment, with one of the most
immediate and expansive interpretations being that courts were not
obligated to distinguish between the two instances of insolvency—
based upon facts and claims of breach of fiduciary duties. 58 A
restrictive interpretation of the judgment was applicable where the
creditors evidenced actual fraud or preference by the directors. 59
Accordingly, under the latter approach, the creditors were required
to prove that the fraud involved the disposal of assets for the benefit
of shareholders, but to the prejudice of the “entire” corporate
enterprise and not in favour of “any” particular creditor class, 60
thereby shielding the directors. This resulted in the “law of
fiduciary duty being used to fill gaps in the legal position that did
not exist” as a matter of ex abundati cautela for which the creditors
already possessed statutory protections in the nature of avoidable
transactions under the law on implied covenants of good faith and
fraudulent conveyance, leading to an overprotection of creditors.61
The Delaware Supreme Court later overruled Credit Lyonnaies in
North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v.

56
Robert Morris, Directors’ Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A Comment
on Credit Lyonnaise, 19 J. CORP. L. 61, 62 (1993).
57
Cory Dean Kandestin, The Duty to Creditors in Near-Insolvent Firms:
Eliminating the “Near-Insolvency” Distinction, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1246–59 (2019).
58
In re Buckhead Am. Corp., 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994).
59
In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. 646, 655-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1998). See generally Vincent S.J. Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2013)
(describing the dynamic of “vertical investor conflict” between shareholders and
creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings).
60
Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Director’s Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1513–18 (1993).
61
Mariana Pargendler, Modes of Gap Filling: Good Faith and Fiduciary Duties
Reconsidered, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1315, 1325–44 (2008); Prod. Res. Grp. v. NCT Grp., 863
A.2d 772, 797 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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Gheewala,62 holding that the former created a situation wherein the
directors were left vulnerable to legal action by creditors as and
when the company neared financial distress, resulting in a complete
altering of their functioning.63 The court observed:
When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of
insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change:
directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the
corporation
and
its
shareholders
by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of th
e corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.64
Thus, Gheewalla reverted to a rationale of existing remedies
available for creditors and merely allowed recourse to derivative
actions claims in exceptional circumstances.65 This meant that the
borderline stage was not to be considered a triggering event for the
shifting of duties, and the safe harbour of the business judgment rule
was applicable to companies. In effect, in the United States, as of
now, directors owe no direct fiduciary duties to creditors simply by
virtue of the company being in the borderline stage.66

62
N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
101 (Del. 2007).
63
Id.; see also Anna Manasco Dionne, Living on the Edge: Fiduciary Duties,
Business Judgment and Expensive Uncertainty in the Zone of Insolvency, 13 STAN. J.L.,
BUS. & FIN. 188, 188–90 (2007) (noting the set of doctrinal problems and practical
costs of creditors’ ability to litigate when the extent of Delaware directors’ fiduciary
duties to creditors during financial distress remains unclear).
64
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.
65
These include instances of decisions which have had an adverse impact on
the company. See Bryan Anderson, Gheewalla and Insolvency: Creating Greater
Certainty for Directors of Distressed Companies, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1031, 1045 (2009)
(discussing the difficulty of determining the fiduciary duties of constituents in a
financially distressed corporation).
66
Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 546–48 (Del.
Ch. 2015); Berg & Berg Enters. v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 891–96 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009). See generally Mark Chebi & John Lyons, Delaware Court of Chancery Decision
Clarifies Fiduciary Issues in Insolvent Company Context, 11 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 244
(2015) (discussing the Court of Chancery of Delaware’s decision to reinforce the
protections of the business judgment rule).
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2.2. Director Liability Framework in the U.K.
In the U.K., Chapter II of the Companies Act of 2006 incorporates
the business judgement rule and imposes general fiduciary duties
on directors during solvency.67 This includes the duty to promote
success of the company (synonymous to the good faith statutory
duty), exercise independent judgement, reasonable care and due
diligence, avoid conflict of interest and declare related party
transactions. 68 The duties are assessed from the perspective of a
reasonable man who has the expected general knowledge, skill, and
experience of a director. 69 These duties are subordinate to the
interest of the company, meaning that derivative action claims can
be initiated by shareholders for breach of these duties during
solvency and non-shareholder constituencies are excluded from the
protection.70 The trust fund doctrine, on the other hand, has been
not been frequently drawn on by the courts due to express
codification of director duties under § 172 of the Companies Act of
2006.71
Section 172(3) of the Companies Act of 2006 shifts the directors’
duties toward creditors during actual insolvency due to their riskbearing capacity.72 Moreover, courts in the U.K. have expansively
interpreted § 172(3) to cover fiduciary duties of directors even
during the borderline stage as compared to the U.S.73 For instance,
in Colin Gwyer it was held that, where a company is insolvent or of
Companies Act 2006, c.2 (Eng.).
Id. §§ 172–177.
69
Richmond Pharmacology Ltd. v. Chester Overseas Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch)
2692, [68] (Eng.).
70
ANDREW R. KEAY, THE DUTY TO PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF THE COMPANY: AN
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 172 OF THE COMPANIES ACT OF 2006, at 89, 109–43 (2012);
Andrew R. Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is It Fit for
Purpose? 27 (Aug. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
71
Daniel Attenborough, Misreading the Directors’ Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith,
20 J. CORP. L. STUD. 73, 75 (2020).
72
Companies Act 2006, § 172(3) (Eng.); Re Pantone, 485 Ltd. [2002] 1 BCLC
266 [69] (Eng.); see also Colin Gwyer & Assocs. Ltd. v. London Wharf (Limehouse)
Ltd. [2003] 2 BCLC 153 (Ch), [87] (Eng.) (claiming “the directors when considering
the company’s interests must have regard to the interests of the creditors.”); John
Armour, et al., Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41
BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531, 541–45 (2003) (discussing the shifting primacies of
shareholders and stakeholders when a corporation enters insolvency).
73
GHLM Trading Ltd. v. Maroo, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 61, [168] (Eng.).
67
68
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doubtful solvency or on the verge of insolvency and it is the
creditors’ money which is at risk the directors, when carrying out
their duty to the Company, must consider the interests of the
creditors as paramount. 74 However, the risk-bearer during the
borderline stage remained unclear due to incorporation of multiple
insolvency determination criteria that seemed similar but were
interpreted differently. 75 Section 212 imposes liability of
malfeasance where directors are held accountable for
misapplication or retention of corporate property in breach of
fiduciary or other duties, including negligence.76 However, where
any payment is made for a proper corporate purpose and in the
interests of the company’s creditors, then liability is exempted. 77
Specifically with respect to borderline insolvency, §§ 213 and 214 of
the Insolvency Act of 1986 imposes the fraudulent and wrongful
trading standards liability upon directors pursuant to which they
are not to misapply or retain corporate assets and avoid insolvent
liquidation of the company. 78 Sections 213 and 214 involve civil
liability with discretion to the courts in ascertaining the extent of
personal liability of directors with the objective of compensating
creditors for the loss caused by the director’s conduct. 79 The
remedies available to aggrieved parties includes restoration of the

74
Colin Gwyer & Assocs. Ltd. v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd. [2003] 2
BCLC 153 [74] (Eng.).
75
In multiple judgments, there have been references to criteria like “nearing
insolvency,” “borderline insolvency,” “verge of insolvency,” and “doubtful
solvency.” See The Liquidator of Wendy Fair (Heritage) Ltd. v. Hobday [2006]
EWHC (Ch) 5803 [6] (Eng.) (using the term “nearing insolvency”); Eastford Ltd. v.
Gillespie, Airdrie N. Ltd. [2010] CSOH 132 [22] (using the term “borderline
insolvency”); Sundaresh, supra note 40, at 326–27 (listing a string of words used for
the tests to determine the point at which fiduciary duties should shift to creditors
pre-insolvency); Andrew Keay, The Shifting of Directors’ Duties in the Vicinity of
Insolvency, 24 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 140, 153 (2015) (suggesting that, due to minute
differences between these criteria, the nearer a company gets to actually being
insolvent, the triggering of fiduciary duties of directors becomes more obvious).
76
Kristin van Zwieten, Director Liability in Insolvency and Its Vicinity, 38
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 382, 401–02 (2018).
77
GHLM Trading Ltd. v. Maroo, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 61 [29], [111] (Eng.); Re
HLC Environmental Projects Ltd. (in liquidation) [2013] EWHC (Ch) 2876 [108]
(Eng.).
78
Howard Morris & Edward Downer, The Truth about Dishonesty in
Fraudulent Trading under English Law, 16 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 38, 39–40, 42 (2020).
79
Valentine v. Bangla Ltd. [2009] EWHC 1632 (Ch), [41] (Eng.); Re Ralls
Builders Ltd. (in liquidation) [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch), [219]–[251] (Eng.).
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property along with interest thereon. 80 Further, § 214 of the
Insolvency Act 1986 clearly articulates that the directors must
undertake every step to minimise the potential loss to creditors
during borderline insolvency.81 This seems to imply that creditors
have recourse to direct and indirect action against directors, unlike
in the U.S.82
However, the directors are granted exemption from the rigours
of wrongful trading liability if they undertook measures to minimise
the potential loss to the company’s creditors, subject to a clear nexus
between loss sustained by the company and director decisions. 83
This is elaborated in the later section of the paper. The standard for
director liability during borderline insolvency, as held by the courts,
is to guide the company directors to make intelligent and honest
decisions which could be reasonably believed to be for the benefit of
the company.84
In the U.K., the scheme of avoidance transactions under the
Insolvency Act of 1986 includes significant undervaluation of
corporate property, 85 preferring one creditor over another, 86 and
extortionate dealing involving grossly exorbitant credit payments.87
80
Liquidator of Marini Ltd. v. Dickenson [2003] EWHC (Ch) 334 [72] (Eng.);
Hans Hirt, The Wrongful Trading Remedy in U.K. Law: Classification, Application and
Practical Significance, 1 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 71, 99–100 (2004).
81
Insolvency Act 1986, c. 10, § 214(3) (Eng.) (“The court shall not make a
declaration under this section with respect to any person if it is satisfied that after
the condition specified in subsection (2)(b) was first satisfied in relation to him that
person took every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the
company’s creditors as ([on the assumption that he had knowledge of the matter
mentioned in subsection (2)(b)]) he ought to have taken.”).
82
See A. Keay & J. Loughrey, An Assessment of The Present State of Statutory
Derivative Proceedings, in DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN THE
WAKE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 187, 187–88, 215 (John Loughrey, ed. 2013).
83
In Re Continental Assurance Co. of London Plc (in liquidation) [2007] 2
BCLC 287 (refusing to impart liability because it had allowed the company to
continue trading during borderline insolvency); see also Chan Ho, On Deepening
Insolvency and Wrongful Trading, 20 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REGUL. 1 (2005) (outlining
the defense available for a director if she took every step to minimize the potential
loss to the company’s creditors).
84
Charterbridge Corp. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. [1968] Ch 62 [75]; Colin
Gwyer v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd. [2003] 2 BCLC 153 [74], [83].
85
Insolvency Act 1986, § 238 (Eng.).
86
Id. § 239; see In Re Cosy Seal Ltd. (in administration) [2016] EWHC (Ch)
1255, [140] (arguing that a preferential transaction can be set aside if the transaction
positively improved the creditor’s position).
87
Insolvency Act 1986, § 244 (Eng.)
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Director liability can be materially diminished if the company does
not suffer losses on account of the concerned transaction.88 Thus the
recourse to remedies against directors’ actions under the wrongful
trading liability standard can be ordered during insolvent
liquidation, whereas those under the Companies Act of 2006 can be
ordered even during solvency or borderline insolvency,89 thereby
providing creditors with an adequate safety net at all stages.
3.

DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK IN INDIA

Prior to the enactment of the IBC, corporate insolvency for
industrial companies 90 was governed by the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter “SICA”),
whereas liquidation and winding-up for non-industrial entities was
governed by the Companies Act of 2013.91 With the introduction of
the IBC, the director responsibility frameworks for solvent
companies is now solely governed by the Companies Act of(2013)
and that of insolvent companies by the IBC.92 While the focus of this
paper is on borderline insolvency, it is essential that the director
responsibility framework, as is applicable in case of solvency, is
deliberated due to fragmented director obligations under different
legislations. In this section, the applicable framework for the
different stages of the company in India is explained.

Re Ralls Builders Ltd (in liquidation) [2016] EWHC (Ch) 1812 [32].
Harry Rajak, Director and Officer Liability in The Zone of Insolvency: A
Comparative Analysis, 11 POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 31, 48, 53–54 (2008).
90
An industrial company is defined as a company which owns one or more
industrial undertakings and carries out work in one or more factories but excludes
small scale industries and ancillary industries. See The Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985, § 3(e) (India) (defining “‘industrial company’ as a
company which owns one or more industrial undertakings”).
91
See generally Yogendra Nath Mann & Kavindra Nath Mann, Corporate
Insolvency Law in India: Provisions and Effectiveness, in CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW
AND BANKRUPTCY REFORMS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 74 (2019) (offering an overview
of corporate law in India).
92
Joshi, supra note 16.
88
89
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3.1. Solvency:
The Companies Act of 2013, read with the SEBI (Listing
Obligations & Disclosure Requirements) Regulations of 2015,
largely governs director-specific corporate governance of
companies during solvency. 93 It provisions for board committees,
auditors and auditor standards, internal controls and mechanisms,
and disclosure and transparency compliances. 94 The director
liability framework is governed by imputation of vicarious liability
on directors responsible for conduct of business and on those who
actually participated in commission of the offense.95 The Companies
Act of 2013 under § 2(60) includes the whole-time director,
independent directors and executive directors as “officers-indefault”,96 and these company representatives shall be liable for any
penalty or punishment imposed by law enforcement authorities in
accordance with the law time being in force.97
The imputation of liability can be both civil and criminal under
the Companies Act of 2013 depending upon the nature of the
93
See generally SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements)
Regulations, 2015 (laying out regulations for companies during solvency).
94
SEBI (Listing Obligations & Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015,
Regs. 18, 19, 20, 21.
95
Secs. & Exch. Bd. of India v. Gaurav Varshney, (2016) 14 SCC 430, para. 12.
96
The Companies Act, 2013, § 2(60) (India) (“Definitions . . . .”[O]fficer who
is in default”, . . . means any of the following officers of a company, namely:— (i)
whole-time director; (ii) key managerial personnel; (iii) where there is no key
managerial personnel, such director or directors as specified by the Board in this
behalf and who has or have given his or their consent in writing to the Board to
such specification, or all the directors, if no director is so specified; (iv) any person
who, under the immediate authority of the Board or any key managerial personnel,
is charged with any responsibility including maintenance, filing or distribution of
accounts or records, authorises, actively participates in, knowingly permits, or
knowingly fails to take active steps to prevent, any default; (v) any person in
accordance with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of
the company is accustomed to act, other than a person who gives advice to the
Board in a professional capacity; (vi) every director, in respect of a contravention of
any of the provisions of this Act, who is aware of such contravention by virtue of
the receipt by him of any proceedings of the Board or participation in such
proceedings without objecting to the same, or where such contravention had taken
place with his consent or connivance; (vii) in respect of the issue or transfer of any
shares of a company, the share transfer agents, registrars and merchant bankers to
the issue or transfer[.]”).
97
See Vyapak Desai & Ashish Kabra, Director and Officer Liability in India, 41
LITIG. 17, 17–18 (2015).
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offense. 98 For criminal liability there must be specific averments
against the director showing as to how and in what manner the
director was responsible for the conduct of the business of the
company and if the person responsible to the company for the
conduct of the business of the company, was not in charge of the
conduct of the business of the company, then he can be made liable
only if the offence was committed with his consent or connivance or
as a result of his negligence.99
Similarly, criminal liability can be imposed only if the statute
stipulates the liability of directors and “there is sufficient evidence
of the director’s active role coupled with criminal intent. 100 The
imposition of civil liabilities depends upon a preponderance of
probabilities, whereas for the imposition of criminal liabilities, the
criminal conduct must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.101
The Companies Act of 2013 for the first time codified director
fiduciary duties within the Indian director liability jurisprudence.
Akin to the U.K., §§ 166 (2) – (6) of the Indian Companies Act of 2013
provides for the application of business judgment rule and civil
obligations upon the directors who must act in good faith, foster the
mission and vision of the company, and factor in the best interests
of the company and its employees, shareholders, community, and
environment.102 Similarly, § 166(7) of the Companies Act of 2013
incorporates the trust fund doctrine and imposition of penalty upon
failure of fulfilment of duties as specified under § 166(2). 103
The Companies Act, 2013, §§ 447–453 (India).
K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48, 57.
100
Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609. 638
101
See generally Rohitkumar Premkumar Gupta v. SEBI, 2021 SCC Online SAT
216, ¶ 20 (stating the standards for criminal prosecution).
102
See generally Vikramaditya Khanna & Shaun J. Mathew, The Role of
Independent Directors in Controlled Firms in India: Preliminary Interview Evidence, 22
NAT’L. L. SCH. INDIA REV. 35, 49 (2010) (displaying that the key matter for the Court
was whether the director can make a decision based solely on the best interests of
the firm, without being influenced by financial, social or other considerations that
are not germane to the firm’s best interests); Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam
Sundar Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669 (holding the rule as, “wherever any
shareholder has proposed to transfer his shares to some new member, the court
shall presume that their motives are arbitrary and capricious, or their conduct is
corrupt unless you choose to tell the Court what their reasons were would amount
to altering the whole constitution of the company”). Sundaresh, supra note 40, at
336.
103
See Sundaresh, supra note 40, at 336 (stating the application of the trust
fund doctrine).
98
99
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However, unlike in the U.S. or the U.K., there has not been sufficient
deliberation by courts on the scope of the § 166 fiduciary duties and
the remedies available for their consequent breach. In the latest case
dealing with the breach of fiduciary duties and derivative actions
under the Companies Act of 2013, Rajeev Saumitra v. Neetu Singh, the
Delhi High Court dealt with allegations that a director attempted to
gain undue advantage for himself over his company, a potential
breach of fiduciary duties. 104 The Delhi High Court held that a
breach of fiduciary duties under § 166 of the Companies Act of 2013
entitles the shareholder to the right to initiate an indirect action
claim against the defaulting director. 105 While the Court didn’t
clarify if a direct action claim exists during solvency due to noncodification of derivative actions under the Companies Act of 2013,
it can be implied that both direct and indirect action claims can be
admitted on breach of director duties, as there exists no prohibition
on the same.106
On the procedural front, directors are expected to exercise
independent judgment with reasonable care, skill, and due diligence
on par with the common law principles of fiduciary duties. 107
Although directors owe fiduciary duties, they owe no contractual
duty with respect to third parties except where they make
themselves personally liable or induce a third party to act to their
detriment.108 In the case that a third party proves such fraudulent
misrepresentation, a director may be held personally liable to said
104
See generally Rajeev Saumitra v. Neetu Singh, Unreported Judgments, 2528
of 2015, decided on Jan. 27, 2016 (Delhi HC) (stating the allegations).
105
Id.
106
See Umakanth Varottil, Delhi High Court on Directors’ Duties and Derivative
Actions, INDIACORPLAW (Feb. 28, 2016), https://indiacorplaw.in/2016/02/delhihigh-court-on-directors-duties.html [https://perma.cc/3VH9-SCLX] (clarifying
there were no prohibitions on certain claims).
107
See Dale & Carrington Investment P. Ltd. v. P.K. Prathapan, AIR (2004) SC
601 (displaying that the fiduciary capacity within which the directors have to act
gives them a duty to act on behalf of a company with the utmost good faith, utmost
care and skill, and utmost due diligence in the interest of the company they
represent); Debanshu Mukherjee & Astha Pandey, The Liability Regime for NonExecutive and Independent Directors in India: A Case for Reform, VIDHI CTR. FOR LEGAL
POL’Y,
(Sept.
19,
2019),
https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Final-Director-Liability-Report-September-19-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E3TR-EBNZ] (describing the fiduciary duty of directors).
108
See generally Mukesh Hans v. Smt. Uma Bhasin, Unreported Judgments,
495 of 2010, decided on Aug. 16, 2010 (Delhi HC) (stating the circumstances of
liability for directors).
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third party.109 However, over a period of time, certain exceptions
have evolved for protection from liability for different categories of
directors on account of their activities and involvement with
company affairs. While independent directors are required to
observe § 166 duties, they are only liable for the company’s acts of
omission or commission that occurred with their knowledge or are
attributable through board processes, and with their consent or
connivance.110 A non-executive director is not considered an officerin-default and is not liable for company defaults unless it is proven
that he was at the helm of the decision-making process for the affairs
of the company.111 Further, the companies must take all precautions
to ensure that civil or criminal proceedings are not unnecessarily
initiated against the independent or non-executive directors unless
sufficient evidence exists.112
3.2. Insolvency
The IBC follows a creditor-in-possession model of insolvency
resolution, and the business affairs and operational decision-making
lie with the appointed resolution professional. 113 The resolution
professional will work within the mandate and guidance of the
Committee of Creditors (hereinafter “CoC”), and the elected board
of directors of the company are ousted. 114 Importantly, in India,
under § 29A of the IBC, the promoters of the company are
disqualified from becoming involved in the rehabilitation process
109
See generally Khanna Mathew, supra note 102 (discussing potential liability
for directors).
110
The Companies Act, 2013, § 149(12) (India).
111
See Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal
Nos. 2604-2610 of 2014, decided on Dec. 17, 2014 (SC); Union Carbide Corp. v.
Union of India, 1990 AIR 273 (discussing when liability attaches to a director).
112
See generally Ministry of Corporate Affairs, General Circular, 20/2020
(Issued on May 5, 2020) (discussing who assumes liability when directors have
given consent).
113
See Anirudh Burman, India’s Sustained Economic Recovery Will Require
Changes to Its Bankruptcy Law, CARNEGIE INDIA (Apr. 5, 2021) (describing IBC’s
current model of creditor-in-control).
114
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 17 (India); see also Ankeeta
Gupta, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: A Paradigm Shift Within Insolvency Laws
in India, 36 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUD. 75, 84 (2019) (stating the mandates of the
resolution professional).
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and cannot submit a resolution plan for revival.115 While the policy
rationale behind § 29A lies upon the moral argument of not diluting
control of the revived company through the hands of the promoters
§ 29A has also led to results
which led to its insolvency, 116
hampering effective resolution. The lack of professional experience
and business acumen of the resolution professional has resulted in
an erosion of value117 and increased his burden when he is already
obligated to perform various administrative and representative
activities concerning the resolution. 118 Similarly, there have been
several attempts made to circumvent the strict rigors of § 29A by the
promoters and the board of directors, which have resulted in the
lifting of the corporate veil of the company. 119 This has led to
insurmountable transactional and insolvency costs for the eventual
resolution applicant and haircuts for creditors in case of
liquidation.120

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 29A (India)
See Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2019 SCC 73, ¶ 2 (describing
the background of Section 29A)
117
See generally Pratik Datta, Value Destruction and Wealth Transfer Under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Nat’l Inst. Pub. Fin. and Pol’y, Working Paper
No. 247, 2018) (discussing the limitations on the resolution professional).
118
See generally Golden Jubilee Hotels Ltd. v. EIH Ltd., Unreported
Judgments, 4881 of 2018, decided on Sept. 27, 2016 (Telangana HC) (stating the
administrative duties of the resolution professional).
119
See Sikha Bansal & Megha Mittal, Streamlining Section 29A of IBC, VINOD
KOTHARI
CONSULTANTS
(2021),
https://vinodkothari.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/Streamlining-Sec-29A-of-IBC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2278-7FWW] (discussing the recent issues with Section 29A).
120
See Sikha Bansal, An Odd Scheme: Case for Exclusion of Schemes of
Arrangement from Scheme of Liquidation, VINOD KOTHARI CONSULTANTS (2021),
https://vinodkothari.com/2021/03/an-odd-scheme-case-for-exclusion-ofschemes-of-arrangement/ [https://perma.cc/QG2S-FN9J]; see also Sikha Bansal,
Resurrecting the Deadb- A Discussion Around Schemes of Arrangement in Liquidation,
KOTHARI
CONSULTANTS
(2019),
VINOD
https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=13208808612107300009208507311
310510812501800104709102200012508800612512409409212712604505500310112602
711102607709809909006806800904102305908402703007311711912509609107200300
400011202308608309600708308410711910012709507612702307212309510609400511
7066093&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE [https://perma.cc/S6B3-PQYZ] (stating the
circumvention of Section 29A).
115
116
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3.3. Borderline Insolvency:
Borderline insolvency, as discussed in the beginning, is the stage
where the company is under financial stress (or where the net
liabilities exceed the net assets), but it is has not entered formal
insolvency proceedings. 121 This twilight zone is critical for the
survival of the company and the preservation of its value, whatever
it may be worth. The IBC, while consolidating the winding-up
provisions under the Companies Act of 2013, 122 provides for
directors’ liability not previously envisaged under any corporate
legislation in India. Section 43 of the IBC imposes a duty upon the
company (and indirectly upon the directors) to not prefer a
particular creditor over fellow creditors, outside of the ordinary
course of business, within the claw-back period of two years. If such
an arrangement has been undertaken, the NCLT under § 44 of IBC
will require the company to reverse the transaction and vest within
itself the disposed property.123 Similarly, § 45 of the IBC also bars
directors from significantly undervaluing corporate property and
shall be required to reverse the transaction when it is declaring as
void by the NCLT.124 Further, the directors are disallowed to carry
on the business of the company with an intent to defraud creditors.
This wrongful trading liability under § 66 of the IBC can be imposed
only when “[the] director knew or ought to have known that the
there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding the . . . insolvency
[proceedings]” and “did not exercise due diligence in minimising
the potential loss to the creditors.” 125 The wrongful trading
standard does not envisage a look-back period to ensure that
dishonest directors are subjected to the liability even in view of lapse
of time.126 The wrongful trading standard covers a broad spectrum
of actions which directors can undertake to mitigate losses and they
will be evaluated as having the capacity of a “reasonable competent
Purslowe, supra note 15.
See K.S. Hareesh Kumar, Winding up of Companies Under Companies Act,
2013 & Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016, MGMT. ACCT., October 2017, at 48 (stating
how the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code consolidates the winding up provisions
under the Companies Act, 2013).
123
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 44 (India).
124
Id. § 45.
125
Id. § 66.
126
Nandkishor Vishnupant Deshpande v. Worldwide Online Servs. Priv.
Ltd., 2021 SCC Online SC 26.
121
122
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director,” which could include not incurring further debts and
making active efforts to rehabilitate the company.127 In addition to
civil liability, directors are also subject to criminal penalties for
defrauding creditors during both insolvency and borderline
insolvency.128 The concerned director of the company is subjected
to imprisonment of a maximum term of five years, and/or with a
maximum fine of one crore rupees for defrauding creditors.129
The jurisprudence and practice on undervalued and wrongful
trading standards is yet to be developed in India. Accordingly, in
scholarly discourse, there has been repeated reference to foreign
judgements, especially from the U.K., for interpretation due to the
similarity in statutory law. The “intent to defraud” standard130 can
be proved when a director had actual or constructive knowledge
that there were no reasonable prospects of receiving debt
payments.131 Accordingly, when a company continues to incur debt
with no reasonable prospect of payment to creditors, it is proper to
infer an intention of carrying on business with an intent to defraud
creditors. 132 To determine if knowledge of commencement of
insolvency duties can be imputed upon directors, the litmus test
must be applied: whether a reasonable person, aware of the
precarious condition of the corporation, would enter into such a
transaction.133
Id. at 28–29.
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 69 (India).
129
Id.
130
See Jitesh Maheshwari, SEBI’s Policy on Self-Trades, INDIACORPLAW (Sept.
4,
2017),
https://indiacorplaw.in/2017/09/sebis-policy-self-trades.html
[https://perma.cc/5V9Q-YPCM] (noting that while SEBI regulations do not define
“intent to defraud/deceive,” SEBI clarified in its 2017 policy that the intention to
deceive/defraud is a sine qua non for establishing manipulation in case of selftrades, and that accidental or unintentional self-trades are not covered under FUTP
Regulations; however, this standard applies mainly in the context of fraudulent
securities trading, and the “intention” definition in the insolvency context remains
undefined).
131
See BTI 2014 LCC v. Sequana S.A. [2019] EWCA (Civ) 112 [147] (holding
that “a payment made to the prejudice of current or continuing creditors when a
likelihood of a loss to them ought to have been known is capable of constituting
misfeasance by the directors; and they may be made liable for it in an action of the
present kind”).
132
Utsav Mitra, Emerging Jurisprudence on Corporate Insolvency: Director
Duties in the Twilight Zone 7 (Oct. 10, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the authors).
133
Morphitis v. Bernasconi, [2003] 2 BCLC 1.
127
128
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Thus, drawing from a comparative perspective, Indian directors
can also be made liable where they acted dishonestly, but were
negligent in exercising their fiduciary duties.134 Judicial bodies can
reference the existing corporate position when reviewing the context
of director liability during borderline insolvency to interpret the
liability standards until there is legislative clarity. In fact, in Jet
Airways135 and Dhoot,136 the NCLAT and NCLT referenced the extant
international position on cross-border and group insolvency
instances to resolve the dispute in absence of relevant legislative
provisions.137
4. CHALLENGES TO DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK &
SOLUTIONS IN INDIA
Indian law on the duties of directors during the borderline
insolvency stage has not seen a high judicial interpretation. This has
led to several inconsistencies, for which authors in the succeeding
section attempt to highlight and provide solutions. While the thrust
of this paper focuses on borderline insolvency, it is essential that
certain substantive and procedural changes are made regarding the
solvent and insolvent stages of a company so that the efficiency of
director liability framework during the borderline stage is
strengthened.

134
Nandkishor Vishnupant Deshpande v. Worldwide Online Servs. Priv.
Ltd., (2021) SCC Online SC 27 (India).
135
Jet Airways (India) Ltd. v. State Bank of India, 2019 SCC Online NCLT
12710 (emphasizing cross-border collaboration during an insolvency process).
136
State Bank of India v. Venugopal Dhoot, 2019 SCC Online NCLT 745
(holding that applying a blanket analysis across a group of insolvents is not valid
and that each entity must be examined contextually).
137
See Gabriela Roca-Fernandez, Cross-Border Insolvency in India: A Resistance
to Change, 29 TUL. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 99, 110–11 (2021) (highlighting that Indian
law lacks a structural framework for addressing cross-border insolvency, and that
instead the government employs a “case-by-case” analysis when decided whether
to make related agreements).
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4.1. Direct and Indirect Remedies for Creditors During Solvency
Section 166 of the Companies Act of 2013 does not incorporate
“creditors” as an independent class of non-shareholder
constituency. 138 Therefore, it is important to understand when
creditors are entitled to direct action claims pursuant to § 166 read
with § 408. Our review of the limited § 166 cases suggest that there
has not been a single case initiated as a direct-action claim by
creditors for breach of director duties. This could be associated with
the lack of codification of director duties under the erstwhile
Companies Act of 1956139 and the lack of express codification of the
term “creditors” under the incumbent Companies Act of 2013.
However, there has been an overreliance on the Companies Act of
2013 by creditors initiating oppression and mismanagement suits,
possibly due to its wider scope of application.140 The Companies Act
of 2013 covers actions including breach of fiduciary duties, 141
conduct of management resulting in loss, 142 the conducting of
company affairs contrary to its charter 143 or to the rights of

The Companies Act, 2013, § 166 (India).
Umakant Varottil & Vikaramaditya Khanna, Rarity of Derivative Actions in
India: Actions and Consequences, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 19–20, (Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum & Michael
Ewing-Chow eds., 2012).
140
The Companies Act, 2013, allows the NCLT to order regulation of conduct
future affairs of the company, order the acquisition of shares or interests of any
shareholders, levy restrictions on the transfer or allotment of the shares of the
company, terminate, set aside, or modify any agreement between the company and
directors, set aside any transfer, delivery of goods, payment, execution or other act
relating to property, effectuate the removal of directors, recover undue gains of
directors, and impose costs. See Umakanth Varottil, Unpacking the Scope Of
Oppression, Prejudice And Mismanagement Under Company Law In India 25 (Nat’l
Univ. Sing. L., Working Paper No. 2020/020, 2020) (noting that evidence suggests
shareholders rely on the oppression, prejudice, and mismanagement provision in
Companies Act, 2013, far more than other remedies when initiating suits).
141
See Hemant D. Vakil v. RDI Print and Publ’g Pvt. Ltd. (1995) 84 CompCas
838, 67 (ruling that the committee of directors had acted in breach of fiduciary
duties).
142
See Thomas George v. KCG Verghese (1996) 86 CompCas 213, 35–36
(finding “clear and apparent” mismanagement by directors).
143
See S.M. Ramakrishna Rao v. Bangalore Race Club Ltd. (1970) 40 CompCas
674, 59 (holding that an examination of a director’s conduct relative to their
fiduciary duties rests on the entity’s internal governance terms).
138
139
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stakeholders,144 collusive disposal of corporate assets to directors,145
and diversion of corporate funds for benefit to a particular class of
stakeholders.146
While the scope of remedial measures in case of contravention
of fiduciary duties is generally broader, in effect, however, under the
Companies Act of 2013, the scope of oppression and
mismanagement remedies has had a significant role to play than the
former. As seen in Rajeev Saumitra earlier, indirect derivative actions
claims can be brought before courts by shareholders during
solvency of the company.147 However, the distinguishing point is
that, along with Rajeev Saumitra, all of the other derivative action
claims initiated before Indian courts have been shareholder-driven.
Unlike the positions of the U.S. and the U.K., the lack of creditordriven derivative claims give rise to suspicion about whether the
legislative intent behind the derivative action framework was
supposed to be made applicable to creditors.148
As a response to this, a two-pronged alternative was suggested
by Varottil, the first part of which considers § 166 duties as a
complete code of director duties and remedies thereof, thereby
providing legal certainty.149 The second part considers § 166 as a
partial codification, in addition to applicable common law
principles, thereby providing for broad and basic principles with
which courts can derive detailed discharge mechanism for
directors. 150 Certainly, there is a strong emphasis on having a
144
See generally Bhajirao G. Ghatke v. Bombay Docking Co. Ltd. (1984) 56
CompCas 428, 429 (ruling that an offical administrator should be appointed to “set
the company’s house in order” in response to a showing of board mismanagement).
145
See Col. Kuldip Singh Dhillon v. Paragaon Util. Financiers Ltd. (1986) 60
CompCas 1075 (finding mismanagement where a board neglected to take
appropriate action against a director after it was clear he misappropriated funds).
146
See Bhaskar Stoneware Pipes Ltd. v. Rajindernath Bhaskar (1988) 63
CompCas 184, 37 (holding that the petitioner’s allegation of directors’ diversion of
funds is “such as to show a systemic conduct of oppression of other groups” and
thus is sufficient to make a claim pursuant to the Companies Act, 1956).
147
Rajeev Saumitra v. Neetu Singh, 2015 SCC OnLine Del. 12242
148
Virali Nagda, Derivative Action Suits in Corporate Litigation in India, CBCL
BLOG (Aug. 5, 2017), https://cbcl.nliu.ac.in/company-law/derivative-action-suitsin-corporate-litigation-in-india/ [https://perma.cc/S2ZK-8Y9B].
149
Umakanth Varottil, Codification of Directors’ Duties: Is Common Law
(May
31,
2014),
Excluded?,
INDIACORPLAW
https://indiacorplaw.in/2014/05/codification-of-directors-duties-is.htm
[https://perma.cc/3VH9-SCLX].
150
Id.
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statutory amendment within the Companies Act of 2013 to expressly
allow creditors to take recourse to derivative actions claims against
recalcitrant directors, as they are key stakeholders during
insolvency and borderline insolvency. A similar reference can be
found in § 172 of the U.K. Companies Act of 2006, which, in addition
to provisioning for fiduciary duties of directors, also takes into
consideration that these duties must be exercised in light of the
interests of creditors of the company.151
4.2. Wrongful Trading Liability during Borderline Insolvency
As discussed earlier in Section 3 of the paper, the wrongful
trading standards under § 66 of the IBC imputes liability upon
directors during borderline insolvency if the director had
knowledge (actual or constructive) of impending insolvency of the
company. 152 Further, when directors omission to avoid the
impending insolvency and also exercise due diligence to minimize
losses to creditors also constitutes ground to impute § 66 the IBC
liability. 153 Moreover, bad commercial decisions leading to loss
cannot be considered fraudulent trading.154 However, the case law
is yet to develop in regard to the effective interpretation of the
phrase “standard of knowledge,” although it is known that the
standard takes into consideration subjective factors based on a factby-fact analysis to impute liability. As the terms “reasonable prospect
of avoiding . . . insolvency,”155 “due diligence,”156 and “potential loss”157
are not defined within the IBC, it can result in interpretational
problems among courts, leading to increased transactional costs for
the parties.
Scholars also view that, since the jurisprudence on director
liability imposed during borderline insolvency is still evolving in
151
Collins Ajibo, A Critique of Enlightened Shareholder Value: Revisiting the
Shareholder Primacy Theory, 2 BIRKBECK L. REV. 37, 43 (2014).
152
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 66(2)(a) (India).
153
Id. §§ 66(2)(a)–(b).
154
Venkatesan Sankaranarayanan, the Resolution Professional for RTIL Ltd.
v. Nitin Shambhukumar Kasliwal, 2021 SCC OnLine NCLT 3171.
155
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Bill No. 31, § 66(2)(a) (May 28,
2016) (India) (emphasis added).
156
Id. § 66(2)(b) (emphasis added).
157
Id. (emphasis added).
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emerging economies (including that of India) where insolvency
courts are not sophisticated, it is prudent to exclude the standard of
knowledge to avoid commencement of insolvency proceedings as
provided under § 66(2) of the IBC.158 The U.S. and U.K. positions on
director liability framework, as delineated in § 2, suggest that there
must be a strong coherence and relation between the company (or
solvency) law and insolvency law so that there is no isolated
interpretation of the director’s duties. The absence of such
correlation/guidance under the Indian Companies Act of 2013 for
imposition of duties during borderline insolvency creates a situation
as was prevalent prior to Gheewala in the United States. Prior to
Gheewala, the directors were under the threat of creditors over every
decision in favor of shareholders. 159 There is clearly a need for a
legislative amendment within the Companies Act 2013 that clarifies
that the duty of directors must be in consonance with those taken in
the interests of creditors under the IBC, similar to § 172(3) of U.K.
Companies Act of 2006.160
In fact, the wrongful trading standard under § 66 of the IBC
could be tweaked to incorporate a standard of imposition of liability
wherein the company would not be allowed to incur any new debts
once the directors had knowledge that they will be unable to repay
them. 161 This would help the distressed company to save costs
associated with insolvency proceedings and also take care of the
interests of the creditors by not utilizing funds in an inchoate
158
Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, Towards an Optimal Model of Directors’ Duties in
the Zone of Insolvency: An Economic and Comparative Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. STUD.
365, 389–90 (2021).
159
See Sundaresh, supra note 40, at 303.
160
See The Companies Act, 2013, § 172(3) (India) (articulating the “[d]uty to
Promote the Success of the Company . . . (3) [t]he duty imposed by this section has
effect subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain
circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company”).
161
See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 588G (Austl.) (adopting a similar
provision which states that “directors’ knowledge” of inability to pay debts can be
ascertained if the director was aware at the concerned time that there existed
grounds for suspicion, or a reasonable director in a like position in like
circumstances be so aware; Additionally, incurring debt includes instances of the
payment of dividends, the buyback of shares, redemption of shares, etc.); see also
David Morrison, The Australian Insolvent Trading Prohibition: Why Does it Exist?, 11
INT’L. INSOLVENCY REV. 153, 154–56 (2002) (outlining the shift in Australian
corporate law towards the enhanced protection of creditors); Jason Harris, Director
Liability for Insolvent Trading: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, 23 AUSTL. J. CORP. L.
1, 2 (Oct. 1, 2009) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of the increased powers
granted to Australia’s corporate regulator).
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manner. In our opinion, the wrongful trading standard could also
be made applicable in a phased manner with the existing standard
under § 66(2) of the IBC made applicable upon top 1000 companies
as determined by market capitalization. Consequently, the standard
of not incurring fresh debts coupled with defense of duty to
minimize potential loss to creditors, as already provided under §
66(2) of the IBC,162 can be made applicable to start-ups and small
businesses to foster value creation.
The deterrent effect of the wrongful trading liability (for errorin-judgment and good faith risky business decisions, not for
fraudulent or negligent actions) can be reduced by allowing the
company directors to initiate out-of-court restructuring proceedings
to rectify the impeding insolvency at the earliest and work in interest
of shareholder and non-shareholder constituencies.163 This would
have the effect of prioritizing the debts of existing creditors and
protecting the interests of potential creditors from any instances of
impending insolvency. The condition precedent towards this
development is to have an appropriate non-adjudicatory proceeding
infrastructure with experienced mediators and institutionalized
valuers.
4.3. Lack of Effective Out-Of-Court Restructuring Mechanism within
the IBC
Usually, early detection and resolution of financial distress is
often helpful to save costs associated with formal insolvency
proceedings.164 In court-administered insolvency regimes like that
of the IBC, out-of-court restructuring and workouts reduce the
burden of insolvency courts.165 The director liability framework as
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 66(2) (India).
James M. Peck, David M. Hillman & Elizabeth L. Rose, “Deepening
Insolvency”—Litigation Risks for Lenders and Directors When Out-of-Court
Restructuring Efforts Fail, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 293, 293–94 (2004).
164
See generally Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise and Fall of Regulatory Competition
in Corporate Insolvency Law in the European Union, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 547, 550
(2019) (analyzing the rise and fall of regulatory competition in the sphere of
European corporate insolvency law).
165
As per the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) statistics, more
than 21,200 cases are pending before the NCLT as on December 31, 2020. Ministry
of Corporate Affairs, Lok Sabha Starred Question No. 86, (Issued on Feb. 8, 2021).
See also OITIHJYA SEN ET AL., VIDHI CTR. FOR LEGAL POL’Y, , DESIGNING A FRAMEWORK
162
163
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provided under the Companies Act of 2013, read with the IBC, can
be better complemented by incorporating an out-of-court
restructuring mechanism within the IBC and allowing directors
recourse to it right from the onset of borderline insolvency. While
there exists out-of-court workout mechanisms independent of the
IBC, their effect has been limited to only a certain category of
creditors based upon a certain set of factors.
For example, the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) Prudential
Framework for Resolution of Stressed Assets of (2019)166 provides
for restructuring efforts in the form of a private agreement between
the lender and debtor. However, it is only applicable upon RBIregulated banking creditors. 167 Similarly, a compromise or
arrangement scheme under §§ 230-232 of the Companies Act of 2013
requires a dual majority of shareholders and creditors and becomes
binding on all stakeholders only if 75% of the creditors agree to the
proposal. 168 Further, the RBI also rolled out other informal
restructuring mechanisms like the Corporate Debt Restructuring of
2001 (as revised in 2003), 169 the Strategic Debt Restructuring of
2015, 170 and the Scheme for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed

FOR PRE-PACKAGED INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION IN INDIA: SOME IDEAS FOR REFORM 13
(2020) (noting that pre-packed insolvency process is typically less time-consuming
and cheaper, which might be attractive to small businesses); NEETI SHIKHA &
URVASHI SHAHI, INDIAN INST. OF CORP. AFF., STRENGTHENING INFORMAL
RESTRUCTURING FOR FIRMS 1 (2020) (asserting that “the resolution of debt problems
through non-judicial means seems to be less disruptive and more effective than
formal insolvency procedures”).
166
Reserve Bank of India, Prudential Framework for Resolution of Stressed
Assets, RBI/2018-19/203 (Issued on June 7, 2019).
167
Id.
168
For example, if 1000 members holding 10,000 shares of Rs.10 participate in
the scheme and vote, and of these, one member holding 3,000 shares votes against
approval of the scheme and the remaining 999 members holding 7,000 shares vote
in favour, the approval shall not be granted as even though all but one member vote
in favour, their aggregate share value falls short of 75% of the total share value of
Rs.10,000. See BS. Kyatanagoudar v. Maharashtra Apex Corporation Limited, ILR
2007 Kar 2157 (Karnataka) (reflecting the facts of that case).
169
Reserve Bank of India, Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR), BP.BC. 15
/21.04.114/2000-01 (Issued on August 23, 2001); Reserve Bank of India, Corporate
Debt Restructuring (CDR), DBOD. No. BP.BC.68 /21.04.132/2002-03 (Issued on
February 5, 2003).
170
Reserve Bank of India, Strategic Debt Restructuring Scheme, RBI/201415/627 (Issued on June 8, 2015).
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Assets of 2016,171 but they all failed due to parallel conflicts amongst
different legislation, leading to uncertainty over debt recovery.172
Moreover, the non-recognition of outside court workouts within
the IBC leads to increased burdens upon the insolvency courts.173
While Chapter III-A has been added to the IBC, recognizing prepackaged insolvency for small business debtors, 174 it is, necessary
that this measure be extended to all kinds of debtors to provide
mitigation measures to directors of large corporations as well.
Further, the extension of prepacks to all categories of debtors can
lead to the legitimization of the benefits of insolvency threats on
violation of the restructuring agreement by the debtor and reduce
the overall costs associated with resolution.175 Section 14 of the IBC,
however, bars recoveries outside the IBC, including, inter alia, the
institution of commercial suits’ execution of judgment or decree and
securitisation of property of the company. 176 Since no express
provision within the IBC allows for outside court recoveries, aside
from the pre-packaged insolvency for small businesses, it is essential
that these recoveries be exempted from the rigours of moratorium
under § 14 of the IBC. This change will help to legitimize out-ofcourt recoveries within the formal insolvency framework.

171
Reserve Bank of India, Scheme for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed
Assets, RBI/2015-16/422 (Issued on June 13, 2016).
172
Aparna Ravi, Indian Insolvency Regime in Practice: An Analysis of Insolvency
and Debt Recovery Proceedings, 50 ECON. & POL. WKLY., Dec. 19, 2015, at 50–51.
173
Rajiv Mani, Mediation in Insolvency Matters, in INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA—A NARRATIVE 297, 303 (2020); see Principles for
Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, Revised 2015, WORLD BANK (May 1,
2015),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23356
[https://perma.cc/3S76-SMTX] (recognizing that negotiation and mediation are
effective measures of informal workouts to resolve inter-creditor differences); Nina
Pavlova & Angana Shah, Mediation in the Context of (Approaching) Insolvency: A
Review on the Global Upswing, 14 TRANSNAT’L DISPS. MGMT., Nov. 2017, at 1.
174
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2021, § 8
(Apr. 4, 2021) (India).
175
SEN ET AL., supra note 165, at 13.
176
Rajendra K. Bhutta v. Maharashtra Housing and Area Development
Authority, (2020) 13 SCC 208, paras. 16, 19; Embassy Property Developments Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1542, para. 44.
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4.4. Lack of Coordination of Promoters/Directors during Insolvency
The ownership structures of most Indian companies suggest that
promoters of the company also act on the board of directors. 177
Section 29A of the IBC was incorporated to disallow promoters and
directors who have been responsible for its insolvency from running
the operations of the company.178 It highlights not only the adoption
of the creditor-in-possession model of insolvency resolution but also
the stereotyping of the overall process. However, the resolution
professional must be solely responsible for all legal compliance,
even outside of the IBC, for the smooth functioning of the insolvent
company.179 As a corollary, the company directors are not required
to perform any kind of management functions except those
incorporated under § 19 of the IBC.180 Even then, the duties of the
professional under § 18 of the IBC are wide-ranging and include
ascertaining financial positions, monitoring assets and operations of
the company, receiving creditors’ claims, and taking control of the
company’s assets.181 Thus, it is difficult for a single professional to
177
Ownership Structure of Listed Companies in India, OECD, at 17 (2020),
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ownership-structure-listed-companiesindia.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M7N-HTBK]; see also Apu Manna et al., Impact of
Ownership Structure and Board Composition on Corporate Performance in Indian
Companies, 9 INDIAN J. CORP. GOVERNANCE 44, 45, 48(2016) (noting that promoters,
like other principal groups of shareholders, have different consequent power with
respect to decision making and thus ownership structure may affect corporate
performance).
178
M.P. Ram Mohan & Vishakha Raj, Section 29A of India’s Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code: An Instance of Hard Cases Making Bad Law?, 22 J. OF CORP. L. STUD.,
July 2022, at 3.
179
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, Insolvency Professional to
Ensure Compliance with Provisions of the Applicable Laws, No. IP/002/2018,
(Issued on January 3, 2018).
180
See Kushagra Srivastava, The (Active) Involvement of Directors During
(Mar.
29,
2020)
Insolvency
Proceedings,
INDIACORPLAW
https://indiacorplaw.in/2020/03/the-active-involvement-of-directors-duringinsolvency-proceedings.html [https://perma.cc/8MJM-VCL6] (stating that § 19 of
the IBC mandates omnibus duty on the promoters and management of the
company, including the directors assisting and cooperating with the resolution
professional as he may require, without highlighting any specific function).
181
See Anirudh Burman & Rajeswari Sengupta, Regulating Insolvency
Professionals Under the IBC: Tracing Pathways to Regulation Based on a Study of
Professional Development (May 30, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy) (analyzing the regulation of the
insolvency profession as it has evolved since the enactment of the IBC in 2016); see
also Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for
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undertake all of these duties and fulfill them in a timely manner as
prescribed by the IBC.182 Moreover, the increasing complexities in
conducting business can, at times, lead to situations wherein the
professional may not have adequate experience or knowledge of the
concerned industry in which the company operates.183
With the resolution professional as a profession being developed
gradually in India, it is necessary that guidance of the erstwhile
directors and management is undertaken to better preserve the
value of the company. 184 In addition, a specialized class of
insolvency professionals can be groomed and certified by the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (hereinafter “IBBI”) and
thus have the requisite expertise in conducting investigations into
avoidable transactions. The professionals can be asked to take into
consideration the opinion of the directors of the company, as
suspension of the board of directors under § 17 of the IBC is not
tantamount to suspension of the managing director or other
directors of the company. 185 Further, the Companies Auditor’s
Report Order of 2020186 can mandate the auditor’s report to contain
any likely instances of avoidable transactions.187 The development
Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2021 (mandating that the resolution professional
is required to form an opinion and make determination within 140 days of initiation
of insolvency proceedings towards any avoidable transactions entered into by the
corporate debtor to fast track the proceedings).
182
Golden Jubilee Hotels Ltd. v. EIH Ltd., Civil Revision Petition (2018) SCC
Online Tel 315 (Telangana).
183
Subasri Realty Pvt. Ltd. v. N. Subramanian, 2017 SCC OnLine NCLAT 499.
184
Abhishek Mittapally & Kokila Jayaram, A Study of Insolvency Professionals
in India, in INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA—A NARRATIVE, supra note
173, at 199, 204–05.
185
Section 17 is the only provision of the IBC referring to the suspension of
powers of the board of directors. Section 19 of the IBC merely states that company
personnel including directors, promoters, employees etc. of the corporate debtor
are required to extend assistance to insolvency professional but does not
specifically allow the latter to take into consideration opinion of directors and other
personnel. See Subasri Realty Pvt. Ltd. v. N. Subramanian, 2017 SCC OnLine
NCLAT 499.
186
The Companies Auditor’s Report Order, 2020 is an audit report format for
statutory audits under the Companies Act, 2013 which includes reporting upon,
inter alia, working capital, inventory, assets, guarantees, investments, statutory
liabilities, and default in repayment of borrowings. Ministry of Corporate Affairs,
S.O. 849(E) (Notified on Feb. 25. 2020).
187
Balvinder Singh, IBC: Some Issues in the Processes and Improvements, in
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA—A NARRATIVE, supra note 173, at 121,
125.
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can help in resolving fraudulent conveyances during the solvency
stage itself and save time and costs during the corporate insolvency
of the company. There is clearly a need for a clarificatory
amendment within the IBC to increase the involvement of the
erstwhile management and directors of the company within the
insolvency resolution process to better facilitate the value
preservation of the company.
4.5. Limited Deterrence Measures for Recalcitrant Directors
The civil consequences of the avoidable transactions regime
under the IBC are limited to either claw-back remedial measures in
the form of the recovery of disposed corporate property or the
imposition of fines upon the errant directors.188 As the object of the
wrongful trading liability standard is to encourage responsible exante behaviour on the part of company directors, it is necessary that
the deterrence effect of such opportunistic behaviour be penalized
appropriately.189 A mechanism of director disqualification similar
to § 9 of the U.K. Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986
can be adopted to penalize and disqualify recalcitrant directors on
account of their unfit character to represent a company.190 Section 9
of this U.K. law states that where the conduct of the director is unfit
to be regarded as maintaining a management position role, even in
matters arising out of or related to insolvency, a director
disqualification order can be issued. 191 While, in India, § 164 of
Companies Act of 2013 does not provide contravention of wrongful
trading liability as one of the grounds for director disqualification, a
legislative amendment could be made to effectuate the spirit of the
IBC. The pre-requisite to such a mechanism is having an

188
Yogendra Aldak & Vaishali Goyal, Avoidance of Transactions and Liability of
Promoters under IBC, BAR & BENCH (Apr. 18, 2022, 7:45 AM),
https://www.barandbench.com/view-point/avoidance-of-transactions-andliability-of-promoters-under-ibc [https://perma.cc/AMW3-ATRG].
189
Michelle Welsh & Helen Anderson, Director Restriction: An Alternative to
Disqualification for Corporate Insolvency, 37 CO. & SEC. L. J., no. 1, 2019, at 23, 38–39.
190
Peter Whelan, The Emerging Contribution of Director Disqualification in UK
Competition Law, in THE UK COMPETITION REGIME: A TWENTY-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE
283, 290–93 (Barry Rodger, Peter Whelan & Angus MacCulloch eds., 2021).
191
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, c. 46, § 6 (Eng.).
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appropriate institutional setup between IBBI and the Registrar of
Companies to coordinate the director disqualification system.192
An effective director disqualification system for recalcitrant
directors can result in reputational loss and career damage and act
as a warning for directors of other companies. 193 Further, the
mechanism can help in fostering and re-emphasizing directors’ duty
to act in the best interest of the company, uninfluenced by his/her
personal interests. 194 While the effectiveness of the deterrence
measures within the wrongful trading liability standards remains to
be tested, references from other commercial regulatory regimes
suggest a strong need for internalizing the director disqualification
mechanism.195 The statistics clearly highlight the need for a director
disqualification mechanism for establishing an effective director
compliance culture as envisaged within the IBC.
Even outside of these specific challenges, there remain several
structural problems which require policy-based solutions. An
optimal framework for director liability must also take into
consideration the peculiarities of different categories of corporate
debtors. Micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) form the
backbone of the Indian economy, contributing almost 30% of the
GDP,196 thereby effectuating the need for corporate MSMEs to have
192
DEBANSHU MUKHERJEE & DINKAR VENKATASUBRAMANIAN, VIDHI CTR. FOR
LEGAL POL’Y, INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE JOURNEY SO FAR AND THE
ROAD AHEAD 39 (2018).

193
Consequences of Disqualification, Francis, Wilks & Jones,
https://www.franciswilksandjones.co.uk/smes-directors-shareholders/directorservices/director-disqualification/consequences-of-disqualification/
[https://perma.cc/FUK8-NSJA] (last visited Nov. 18, 2022); Samet Caliskan,
Individual Behaviour, Regulatory Liability, and a Company’s Exposure to Risk:
The Deterrent Effect of Individual Sanctions in UK Competition Law, 10 J. EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 386, 386-89 (2019)

194
See Nicole Kar, Robert Walker & Glen Davies, Competition Disqualification
Orders and the Lessons Which Can Be Learned from the Insolvency Context, 10
COMPETITION L.J. 306, 307 (2011) (explaining the public protection measures
envisioned by Competition Disqualification Orders that remove unfit directors).
195
See generally COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2018-19
24 (2019) (stating that out of the aggregate penalty imposed of Rs. 13,881.73 crore,
merely Rs. 0.37 crore was imposed on individuals and out of which only Rs. 0.10
crore was realized); SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2019-20, at 203 (2020)
(stating that recovery of penalty proceedings was initiated for Rs. 6851.18 crore of
which only Rs. 70.48 crore could be realized).
196
MINISTRY OF MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERS., GOVT. OF INDIA, ANNUAL
REPORT 2018-19, at 27 (2019).
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a specialized framework. The corporate MSMEs can be granted
certain exemptions from the strict rigors of director liability
obligations as financially they may not always be in a position to
take into consideration the interest of different stakeholders at the
same time. 197 Accordingly, the avoidable transactions standards
under the IBC should be made applicable in a phased manner based
upon their growth, especially the onerous wrongful trading
standard, wherein MSMEs may not be in a position to financially
compete with the large conglomerates.198
5.

MEASURES TO MITIGATE DIRECTOR LIABILITY

In the absence of legislative and judicial guidance over
borderline insolvency, it is suggested that the board of directors selfregulate their decisions and actions from the onset of financial
distress until its completion by devising strategies which reduce the
scope for imputation of liability.199 Scholars suggest measures such
as thoroughly documenting all director decisions by weighing the
balance of competing interests amongst different stakeholders and
make informed, reasonable, and good-faith decisions in the interest
of the company.200 Further, regular formal processes to review cash
flow position, actual and contingent outstanding claims, and
possibilities of outside court restructuring at the onset of financial
distress can be implemented. The present section provides an
overview of two such measures which can be undertaken by
197
WORLD BANK GROUP, SAVING ENTREPRENEURS, SAVING ENTERPRISES:
PROPOSALS ON THE TREATMENT OF MSME INSOLVENCY 9 (2018); Hetal Doshi &
Yashasvi Jain, The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Framework and Principle of Business
Efficacy Across Different Jurisdictions, 42 KLUWER BUS. L. REV. 1, 51 (2021).
198
See generally RONALD DAVIS ET AL., MICRO, SMALL, AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE
INSOLVENCY: A MODULAR APPROACH (2018) (explaining the reasons that MSMEs are
more likely to be dependent on favourable legal and regulatory climates than large
businesses in order to survive).
199
See BAHRAM VAKIL & SUHARSH SINHA, LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS FOR
‘WRONGFUL TRADING’ UNDER THE INSOLVENCY & BANKRUPTCY CODE (2020) (stating
that “incentivise directors to take corrective action at the first onset of any financial
distress rather than waiting till a time where saving the company as a going concern
is no longer commercially viable”).
200
See generally Justin Wood, Director Duties and Creditor Protections in the Zone
of Insolvency: A Comparison of the United States, Germany and Japan, 26 PENN STATE
INT’L L. REV. 139 (2008) (analyzing the U.S. corporate law’s approach to the agency
cost problem in the zone of insolvency).
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directors independently to avoid good-faith director liability (in the
nature of error in judgments or honest risky business decisions) for
effective discharge of duties during borderline insolvency.
5.1. Compulsory Director & Officer Liability Insurance
During the lifetime of the corporation, not all decisions taken by
the directors are detrimental towards any particular stakeholders.
These decisions often involve legal and operational risks arising out
of complexities in changing landscape of conducting business
amidst the legal, economic, and financial constraints. 201 Thus,
director and officer (hereinafter “D&O”) liability insurance provides
safeguards in the form of indemnification for personal liability
arising out of negligence, default, misfeasance, misstatement,
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duties or breach of trust by
the company directors. 202 However, guilty actions which involve
elements of malice, connivance and bad faith in nature of fraud are
not covered as part of insurance. 203 Even in the context of
insolvency, where the company has limited assets, D&O insurance
liability aids directors to cover litigation costs.204 Since the directors
are expected to act in the interest and betterment of the company, as
per the business judgment rule, provisioning for D&O liability
insurance presumes the trust of the company in its directors. While
the legal coverage differs from policy to policy, most insurance
policies cover defense and settlement costs, fines and penalties,
environmental damages, and employment termination losses.205
For a successful claim, the acts or decisions of directors must
necessarily be borne out of an error in judgment or negligence, and,
201
Li-Su Huang, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance and Default Risk, 47
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. - ISSUES AND PRAC. 375, 376 (2021).
202
MARÍA GUTIÉRREZ, An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors’ Fiduciary
Duties, 34 RAND J. ECON. 516, 517 (2003).
203
Terrence G. Stolly, Scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995: Unexpected Implications on Director and Officer Liability and D&O Insurance,
29 CAP. U.L. REV. 545, 550 (2002).
204
See Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
Insurance, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1989) (analyzing historical problems with
corporate insurance).
205
Kuei-Fu Li &Yi-Ping Liao, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and
Investment Efficiency, 29 PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 18, 20 (2014).
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if the violation has been committed with the consent or connivance
of the director, there will be no effect on the insurance. 206 In the
U.K. 207 and the U.S., 208 the law statutorily authorizes compulsory
director and officer liability insurance to mitigate director liability
risks against instances of negligence, default, breach of duty or
breach of trust.209 While, in India, § 197(13) of Companies Act of
2013 recognizes the company practice of undertaking D&O
insurances for their directors, 210 Regulation 25 of SEBI (Listing
Obligations & Disclosure Requirements) Regulations of 2015
mandates only the top 100 companies by market capitalization must
undertake the insurance. 211 On account of borderline insolvency
duties being imposed upon the directors under the IBC, it can be
mandated that all public and private companies compulsorily
undertake D&O insurance policies to reduce the stereotyping of
business risks by directors. Similarly, that insurance policy should
cover the risks arising out of claims relating to personal liability in
instances of avoidable transactions such as preference and
undervalued transactions and wrongful trading liability under the
IBC. 212 This would ensure that directors undertake business
decisions without the fear of litigation risk and in line with the spirit
of entrepreneurship as envisaged by the IBC.213
Companies Act 2006, § 232 (Eng.)
Companies Act 2006, § 233 (Eng).
208
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145 (1899).
209
Andres Engert et al., Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and
Creditors of Troubled Companies - Comparative & International Perspectives, 1 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 313, 322 (2007).
210
The Companies Act, 2013, § 197(13) (India) (“Where any insurance is taken
by a company on behalf of its managing director, whole-time director, manager,
Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer or Company Secretary for
indemnifying any of them against any liability in respect of any negligence, default,
misfeasance, breach of duty or breach of trust for which they may be guilty in
relation to the company, the premium paid on such insurance shall not be treated
as part of the remuneration payable to any such personnel.”).
211
SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations,
2015, Reg. 25(10) (“With effect from January 1, 2022, the top 1000 listed entities by
market capitalization calculated as on March 31 of the preceding financial year,
shall undertake Directors and Officers insurance for all their independent directors
of such quantum and for such risks as may be determined by its board of
directors.”).
212
Jonathan Mukwiri, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in the UK, 28 EUR. BUS.
L. REV. 547, 555 (2017).
213
M.S. Sahoo & Anuradha Guru, Indian Insolvency Law, 45 VIKALPA 69, 70
(2020).
206
207
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5.2. Better Negotiation of Debt & Material Supply Contracts
The director’s role is to maintain a fine balance between running
a business smoothly and preserving and enhancing the corporate
value of the business’s assets. Towards this end, the negotiation of
material supply contracts assumes importance in the context of
borderline insolvency and director liability. Since the director
liability framework often acts as a contractual gap-fillers to protect
the interest of shareholders and creditors, it is important that these
contracts precisely define the instance of default, the preconditions
of initiation of insolvency resolution, and options for out-of-court
restructuring.214 One way to accomplish this could be requiring that
the contractual terms that govern defective supply and consequent
breach of terms and conditions be detailed to reduce the instances of
unforeseeable contractual liability.215
Further, contracts can also provide for alternative modes of
recovery outside of the IBC, both during solvency and borderline
insolvency, with time-bound dispute resolution clauses to preserve
the business relationships between a company and its creditors.216
The IBC does not explicitly invalidate ipso facto clauses in the event
of insolvency admission. 217 It is therefore essential that supply
214
See generally Tung, supra note 9, at 615 (arguing that “[f]iduciary duty
serves as the ultimate gap-filling device, completing the open-ended shareholdermanager contract with a hypothetical bargain crafted according to majoritarian
default rules”).
215
Singh, supra note 173, at 122 (“Generally, complaints relating to short
supply, defective supply, breach of terms and conditions should be detailed in the
contract terms with clear timelines, to avoid any confusion.”).
216
It may include adjudicatory recovery before the Debt Recovery Tribunal
under the Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions (RDBFI) Act,
1993, the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, or administratively the Securitisation &
Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI)
Act, 2002. The contract can also serve as a precondition, providing settlement
recovery through mediation or conciliation. See Adam Brenneman & Pamela Arce,
You Have Options: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Insolvency Proceedings,
13 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 336, 337 (2017) (analyzing the option of using arbitration and
mediation to settle bankruptcy proceedings).
217
They are contractual provisions that permit one party to terminate the
contract with its counterparty on occurrence of an “event of default”, which in
context of insolvency implies admission of insolvency petition or commencement
of formal insolvency proceedings. See generally Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. V.
Amit Gupta, (2021) 7 SCC 209, para. 88 (defining ipso facto clauses as contractual
provisions allowing a party to terminate the contract with its counterparty in the
event of default).
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contracts are drafted in a manner that protects the commercial
relationship between the parties, even during the stage of financial
distress resolution. 218 While prescribing that restrictions on
initiating simultaneous default claims against the corporate debtor
and guarantor is unlawful, 219 guarantee contracts can specifically
debar the creditors from initiating simultaneous claims based upon
the same set of debt and default against co-guarantors.220 Further,
the invoice of debt and supply contracts as a matter of good
corporate practice can also provide for the payment of an agreed rate
of interest in the instance of default by any of the parties to avoid
needless litigation. 221 Overall, the company directors can use
creative and detailed contractual terms to avoid unforeseeable
liability of no fault of their own. This may also preserve the
enterprising and risk-taking characteristics of the board.
6.

CONCLUSION

The onset of financial distress within a corporate setup can result
in hasty and negligent decision-making errors, which impact both
shareholder and non-shareholder constituencies. The law on
fiduciary duties aims to minimize and channelize the director
liability upon the responsible person during the life cycle of the
company. The corporate governance norms applicable to the
company don’t end with solvency but strengthen their application
from the borderline stage, leading to the efficient and disciplined
value preservation of corporate assets. As seen in this paper, mature
insolvency jurisdictions like the U.S. and U.K. have devised
deterrence mechanisms for overt director behavior along with
MUKHERJEE & VENKATASUBRAMANIAN, supra note 192, at 34–35.
State Bank of India v. Athena Energy Ventures Pvt. Ltd., (2020) SCC
Online NCLAT 774 para. 19 (holding that proceeding can be maintained against the
debtor and the guarantor).
220
Vishnu Kumar Agarwal v. Piramal Enterprise Ltd., (2019) 346 CompCas
para. 32 (holding that while there is no bar for filing two simultaneous applications
against the debtor and the guarantor, the application against one of the corporate
debtors cannot be admitted against the other debtor). the question on whether
simultaneous claims against co-guarantors can be barred as stated by the NCLAT
in Piramal Case is pending in appeal before the Supreme Court of India.
221
See, e.g., Krishna Enterprises v. Gammon India Ltd., (2018) 144 CompCas
para. 5 (showing that the appellant brought the action partly because of the
agreement does not provide for an agreed rate of interest).
218
219
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appropriate liability minimizing measures. The joint effect of
fiduciary duties envisaged under the Companies Act of 2013 and the
IBC leads to the pre-Gheewala situation, which makes directors
susceptible to excessive and malicious litigation at the hands of
opportunistic shareholders and creditors.
The challenges
highlighted to the Indian director liability framework above have
resulted in a lack of understanding regarding trigger shifting of
duties, nature, beneficiaries of such shifting at different stages, and
the applicability of specific corporate governance norms during
borderline insolvency. The ease of doing business can be amplified
by clarifying (and, to a certain extent, modifying) the extant
framework on director liability, as suggested in this paper. In effect,
however, where governance norms are adhered to in letter and in
spirit, the impact of financial distress can be averted to a
considerable extent.
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